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Chapter 18 
Is emotive theory the philosopher's stone 
of the ordinalist revolution? 
John B. Davis 
In the latter half of the twentieth century economics has come to be regarded 
as a science little different in its use of scientific methods from the longer 
established natural sciences. In good part this has b~en due to economists' 
adoption of sophisticated mathematical models and state-of-the-art econo-
metric techniques that permit empirical testing of formally expressed causal 
relationships. Science since Newton has been understood to be mathematical 
in nature, and good science has for an even longer time depended upon 
evaluating theory according to its ability to explain and predict observable 
events. But is economic behavior truly governed by causal iaws? The 
foundation of modem economics is the theory of individual choice, and while 
we say that circumstances often occasion the choices individuals make, it 
seems inappropriate to make the stronger claim that choices are actually 
caused. Given this, it seems odd that economic behavior is modeled in terms 
of relationships between independent and dependent variables, where the 
former cause or bring about the latter. Indeed one might go so far as to say 
that the reliance on mathematical functions to represent human behavior is a 
misuse of mathematics, and that economics should return to an earlier practice 
of producing more descriptive, qualitative analysis. l 
The argument in this chapter is somewhat more modest. Here it is argued 
that there are significant limitations on the use of mathematics in economics 
on account of the nature of choice behavior, and that these limits have been 
generally overstepped by economists anxious to legitimate social science 
thinking in the wider scientific community. The immediate thesis of the 
chapter is that an important problem in contemporary economics is its 
systematic misapprehension of the nature of practical reasoning or practical 
inference. This misapprehension, it is argued, principally derives from the 
widespread acceptance of Lionel Robbins's critique of value judgments and 
ethics advanced more than a half century ago in his influential methodological 
tract An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932, 
1935). Value judgments and ethical argument of course are only one species 
of practical reasoning. Indeed, pragmatic reasoning without ethical implica-
tion is an equally if not more pervasive form of practical inference. However, 
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Robbin's treatment of value judgments and ethics, which we will see in key 
respects followed the logical positivists' emotivist critique of ethics of the 
1920s and 1930s, applies equally to other forms of practical reasoning. Thus 
Robbins was in effect responsible for a more general critique of practical 
reasoning and inference which, it will be argued here, subsequently encour-
aged a mistaken understanding of economic behavior among later econo-
mists. In essence, Robbins's Essay convinced most economists that 
economics was properly thought a natural science in its scientific method-
ology, when a reasonable assessment of the nature of practical reasoning in 
which economic agents engage should have produced the view that econom-
ics possessed distinctive characteristics as a social science. 
The chapter develops these conclusions in several stages. In the next 
section, the principal differences between deductive or demonstrative reason-
ing and practical reasoning are set forth with special attention to the 
significance of these differences for understanding economics as a social 
science. In the third section, Robbins's characterization of value judgments 
and the connection between his arguments and those of the logical positivists 
A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson are examined. The principal implication of 
Robbins's critique, it will be seen, is the idea that economics is a natural 
science that focuses on truth and causality. In the fourth section, we look at 
the importance of choice behavior in economics and the reasons for saying 
that economics cannot be treated as a natural science but must rather be 
understood as a social science. Finally in the concluding section, the topics 
of measurement, quantification and the empirical work in economics are 
briefly discussed with the aim of outlining the limits of quantitative methods 
in economics. 
FORMS OF REASONING 
Economists do not always .appreciate that the choice behavior they study falls 
within a broader domain of practical reasoning whose logic has been long 
investigated by philosophers, logicians and, more recently, decision theorists. 
Yet it is important to see choice behavior as being part of this larger 
framework, since this serves to distinguish it as a specific form of reasoning 
with its own particular requirements. Perhaps the easiest way to see what this 
involves is to allude briefly to Aristotle who, in a basic distinction since 
maintained by philosophers and logicians, distinguished reasoning by its 
subject matter as either scientific or practical. Scientific or demonstrative 
reasoning, first of all - i.e. what is now characterized as deductive reasoning 
in formal logic - concerns the relation of entailment, whereby valid inferences 
from true premises entail true conclusions. The relation of entailment, it 
should be emphasized, is a relation of necessity, such that should one profess 
belief in the truth of the premises of a valid syllogism, then one can fairly be 
accused of inconsistency should one deny the truth of its conclusion. Thus, 
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for Aristotle, demonstrative reasoning was scientific in that the natural world, 
which he took to be the sole domain of science, was constituted of invariable 
relationships or laws whose investigation demonstrative reasoning assisted. 
On this view, given some generalization from experience that all x's are A's, 
should we find some entity we know to be an x, we would then be entitled 
to infer with certainty that this x was also an A. 
The importance of demonstrative or deductive reasoning to the expansion 
and development of natural science can hardly be exaggerated. Its model of 
science is of a nomological and verificationist form of investigation, the 
object of which is to elaborate highly confirmed generalizations, sometimes 
referred to as laws of nature, which may function as major premises of 
theoretical syllogisms. Indeed, attendant to this logical conception there has 
also developed a philosophy of the meaning of general relationships, namely, 
that they reflect causal connections or causal laws that operate in the world 
itself. That a is always followed by b tells us that b is necessary for a and thus 
a cause of a. Natural scientists have thus made one 01 their chief preoccupa-
tions the empirical substantiation of general relationships. While the empiri-
cal testing of such relationships is a complicated matter - something made 
increasingly evident in debates in recent decades in the philosophy of science 
- in the main, natural scientists still take as their principal task the explanation 
of causal connections in the world through the use of demonstrative reasoning 
and empirical analysis. 
In contrast, practical reasoning or inference, though it may also be 
represented in syllogistic form, is fundamentally different from demonstrative 
reasoning on account of the fact that its conclusion is something that one 
ought to do (in either moral or pure pragmatic terms), not something said to 
be true. That is, practical reasoning prescribes, and is reasoning leading 
toward action, whereas demonstrative reasoning describes, and is reasoning 
toward the truth of a conclusion. This difference is significant with respect to 
our different relations to the respective conclusions of theoretical and 
practical syllogisms. As noted, in demonstrative reasoning one cannot 
consistently deny the truth of a conclusion validly inferred from true 
premises. One is compelled to accept the truth of such a conclusion on pain 
of being inconsistent. With practical syllogisms, however, the conclusion of 
an argument, say, that one ought to perform some action does not in itself 
compel one to perform that action. Suppose, for example, that some practical 
argument produces the conclusion that a certain action is desirable. We all 
recognize that an individual may accept such an argument yet still fail to 
desire the action called for. Nor, moreover, are we inclined to say that this 
involves some sort of inconsistency. Thus, whereas demonstrative reasoning 
concerns relationships which are necessitous and invariable, practical reason-
ing concerns relationships which are contingent and variable. 
This distinction has functioned in one form or another throughout much of 
the history of modem science, with causal relationships being central to 
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natural science reasoning, and social science making individuals' practical 
reasoning behavior central to the examination of society. Indeed social 
scientists have often emphasized that their fields differ from the natural 
sciences by their assumption that social agents engage in purposive behavior 
and intentional action, so that the explanation of human conduct - both of 
individuals and groups of individuals - requires analysis of the processes of 
practical inference this presupposes.2 As might be expected, however, this 
creates significant difficulties for causal analysis in social science. While a 
few have argued that mental events are a part of nature and can both cause 
and be caused in a law-like manner (Davidson 1980), most seem to agree that 
when one is asked why an intentional act was performed, the answer is not 
to be defined in terms of natural or psychological processes but in terms of 
a request for reasons (Anscombe 1957). In essence, intentions are character-
istically cognitive phenomena, and as such cannot be understood in terms of 
patterns of cause and effect, which have very little if anything to tell us about 
the psychological world of motives, reasons and intentions. 
Certainly, then, much more might be said on the subject of the character of 
practical reasoning. What needs to be emphasized here, however, is that the 
practice of employing natural science methods in economics - whereby 
economic choices are modeled as cause and effect relationships - implicitly 
makes specific assumptions about what must pass as practical reasoning in the 
realm of economic behavior. In the natural science model, the economist's 
principal task is to establish law-like generalizations about economic behavior 
that predict future behavior on the basis of past experience. This assumes, 
however, that economic agents are governed by causal relationships rather 
than engage in a practical reasoning that may redirect the future away from 
the pattern of past events. Suppose it is thought that the proposition that all 
x's are A's constitutes a law-like generalization in economic life. Then an 
economic agent who encounters an entity said to be truly an x must act in 
accordance with the proposition that all x' s are A's. Since economic behavior 
is thought to involve reasoning capacity, an individual's failure to observe 
laws that pertain to economic life might indeed be considered a failure of 
rationality. In the language used above, a reasoning agent able to recognize 
true propositions and understand valid inference is thus compelled to act as 
demonstrative reasoning and economic laws dictate. 
We will return to this argument below. Here it only needs to be noted that 
the obviously unacceptable implication of this interpretation of economic 
choice is that it makes economic behavior deterministic. On the natural 
science model of explanation, we seek law-like generalizations, because they 
are believed to reflect underlying causal relationships. Yet it is the consensus 
among philosophers, most social scientists and everyday individuals that 
human behavior is inadequately explained on this model. Though it may be 
possible to inject causal thinking into our accounts of human behavior, this 
is only done by ignoring the vast tide of intentional phenomena that appear 
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to obey and be ruled by an altogether different logic. Aristotle sought to 
capture this distinct component of human behavior by the notion that practical 
reasoning does not compel its conclusions as does theoretical reasoning. 
Modem thinking understands practical reasoning as purposive behavior and 
intentional action. Agents' actions are informed by their intentions in that they 
act in accordance with their intentions, while their intentions themselves are 
formed according to their goals and ends. These goals and ends are then 
themselves evaluated and redetermined as we observe how well our actions 
fit our intentions. 
Given all this, the assertion that most economists employ the methods of 
natural science as their model for explaining economic behavior might well 
seem paradoxical. The theory of price determination that constitutes the main 
body of current economic theory stems from an analysis of what economists 
term agent choice behavior. Central to the idea of choice, however, is the 
assumption that individuals are not compelled to ac," in certain ways. Thus 
how could it have been thought by Robbins that economics was best thought 
to be - as he explicitly insisted - a natural science? This puzzle is important 
for more than historical reasons. At issue is the contemporary understanding 
of economic method and the conception of economics as a science. To better 
approach these larger issues, we tum to Robbin's own thinking and the 
influences upon it during his time from the logical positivists. 
ROBBINS AND THE EMOTIVISTS 
To understand Robbins's critique of ethics and value judgments in his Essay, 
it is valuable to have some basic acquaintance with arguments that the logical 
positivists advanced regarding ethical statements in the same decade as the 
Essay was written. The logical positivists were a group of philosophers and 
scientists that formed in Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s to argue for a 
rigorously empiricist approach to science? Though Robbins did not make 
special reference to the views of the logical positivists in his own works, the 
assumption here is that his thinking was indirectly influenced by their 
arguments, because their ideas had wide appeal, were widely discussed at the 
time and offered the promise of scientific respectability which Robbins 
valued. Irrespective of the question of influence, however, Robbins's own 
views bear striking resemblance to many of those adopted by the logical 
positivists. First and foremost was a common commitment to the project of 
demarcating science from non-science. For both Robbins and the logical 
positivists, science by the 1930s still suffered from undesirable admixtures of 
ethics and metaphysics. Second, there was a conviction on behalf of both that 
non-scientific ideas could be purged from science by the conscious adoption 
of the psychological causes and effects that tended to be associated with their 
utterance. "The emotive meaning of a word is the tendency of a word, arising 
through the history of its usage, to produce (result from) affective responses 
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in people" (Stevenson 1937: 14). As a theory of ethical language, emotivism 
was thus an early form of what ethics philosophers now characterize as non-
cognitivism. Ethical language is non-cognitive on this view, because it is an 
incidental, in itself meaningless, accompaniment to an underlying causal 
process involved in individuals' efforts to pursue their interests through 
psychological manipulation. This underlying causal process could be 
explained in standard natural science terms using deductive logic and 
empirical analysis, but ethical language in itself is meaningless. Thus, 
whereas scientific statements possessed descriptive meaning in virtue of their 
(empirically verifiable) representation of the causal connections we find in the 
world, ethical statements had what Stevenson distinguished as causal 
meaning in that we use this kind of language purely because psychological 
circumstances stimulate us to do SO.4 
Given this, it is not difficult to see that the emotivist doctrine provided 
valuable support for the logical positivists' main contention that science could 
be demarcated from non-science. It was commonplace that people argued a 
great deal about ethical questions, and this might well suggest philosophers 
were right to think that ethical argument obeyed unique rules of reasoning. 
However, the emotivist doctrine struck at the very root of this notion in 
asserting that ethical language was intrinsically meaningless. Not denying 
that people engaged in disputes about ethics, the logical positivists were able 
to argue that the only thing of significance in such arguments fell squarely 
within the province of science. Ayer drew this conclusion quite clearly. 
For we certainly do engage in disputes which are ordinarily regarded as 
disputes about questions of value. But, in all such cases, we find, if we 
consider the matter closely, that the dispute is not really about a question 
of value, but about a question of fact. 
(Ayer 1946:110) 
Generally, then, objective intellectual inquiry corresponds to scientific 
investigation, and science is identical with the nomological, verificationist 
natural science that employed the tools of deductive logic. The logical 
positivists thought that these were particularly important conclusions to draw, 
because they feared science was in danger of incorporating a host of 
irrational, spiritualist notions that might set back the human progress science 
had assisted over the last two centuries. 
Robbins was very sympathetic to this concern.s In his view economics had 
also suffered as a science on account of its failure to define its subject matter 
properly. He disparaged past attempts to describe economics as "the study of 
the causes of material welfare" (Robbins 1932, 1935: 9), and also insisted that 
as the study of resource allocation decisions economics only investigated 
ends-means relationships, not the ends of economic activity themselves. 
[T]he subject matter of Economics is essentially a series of relationships 
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- relationships between ends conceived as the possible objectives of 
conduct, on the one hand, and the technical and social environment on the 
other. Ends as such do not form part of this subject-matter. Nor does the 
technical and social environment. It is the relationships between these 
things and not the things in themselves which are important for the 
economist. 
(p. 38) 
These relationships, Robbins went on to argue, existed in economics in a 
small number of essentially incontrovertible generalizations upon experience. 
In the simple theory of value and exchange where production is not at issue, 
the "main postulate" concerned individuals' capacity for arranging their 
preferences in order. 
The propositions of economic theory, like all scientific theory, are 
obviously deductions from a series of postulates .• And the chief of the 
postulates are all assumptions involving in some way simple and 
indisputable facts of experience related to the way in which the scarcity of 
goods which is the subject-matter of our science actually shows itself in the 
world of reality. The main postulate of the theory of value is the fact that 
individuals can arrange their preferences in an order, and in fact do so. 
(pp.78-9) 
The "main postulate in the theory of production", Robbins continued, was the 
law of diminishing returns. There was then a law of dynamics. From these . 
foundations, all "the complicated theorems of advanced analysis ultimately 
depend". And though "the more complicated applications of these proposi-
tions involves the use of a great multitude of subsidiary postulates . .. [t]he 
truth of the deductions from this structure depends, as always, on their logical 
consistency" (p. 79). 
Clearly, then, though Robbins characterizes economics in the seemingly 
practical terms of means and ends, his view of its subject matter bears little 
relation to the traditional view of practical reasoning. Two things make this 
especially apparent. First, his insistence that the structure of economic 
argument employs postulates, theorems and logical consistency demonstrates 
that Robbins placed considerable weight on using traditional deductive 
reasoning in economics. Indeed, the desire to employ straightforward 
deductive argument in economics seems to have played an important role in 
Robbins's project of redefining economics, since his elimination of the 
material causes of welfare and the ends of economic activity from the domain 
of economics effectively serves to restrict its subject matter to sets of 
generalizable relationships that then readily function as propositions in 
deductive arguments. Second, though Robbins refers to ends-means relation-
ships, his ends-means relationships explicitly exclude any consideration of 
the ends of action. Yet practical reasoning, as the investigation of purposive 
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behavior and intentional action, examines both how individual actions are 
informed by intentions and how the intended ends of action are re-evaluated 
according to the s~ccess of our actions. The ends of action cannot thus be 
excluded from consideration of ends-means relationships if one is concerned 
to explain individuals' processes of practical reasoning, and Robbins's 
willingness to do this consequently betrays a commitment to a different 
approach to explaining economic behavior. 
Why, then, did Robbins think: that the ends of action fell outside the domain 
of economics? Here the influence of logical positivist thinking in the 1930s 
seems to have been crucial. Like the logical positivists, Robbins believed that 
the topic of the ends of action belonged to the domain of ethics, and that ethics 
and economics are "two fields of inquiry ... not on the same plane of 
discourse" because ethics concerned values and economics - as a science -
concerned facts (p. 148). This difference, he emphasized, gave the proposi-
tions of economics a special advantage over those in ethics. Because factual 
propositions are susceptible to empirical verification, true propositions can be 
thought objective. The propositions of ethics, in contrast, must be thought 
subjective, because they lack an evaluation procedure comparable with 
empirical verification. Indeed, this conclusion was central to Robbins's 
famous critique of interpersonal utility comparisons. Earlier (cardinal) utility 
theorists had thought it possible to compare changes in one individual's well-
being with those of another's . Robbins insisted that this involved value 
judgments, because "There is no means of testing the magnitude of A's 
satisfaction as compared with B's" (pp. 139-40). Value judgments, however, 
were subjective, and this implied that interpersonal comparisons of utility 
should be excluded from economics. 
Robbins thus followed the logical positivists both in demarcating science 
and non-science and in regarding ethics as non-science. Yet the objections of 
Robbins and the logical positivists to ethics applied no less to other forms of 
practical reasoning, so that on their understanding social science had to be a 
deductive nomological form of investigation that had as its object the 
explication of causal connections in the social world. It was for this reason 
that Robbins termed economics a natural science, and asserted that "the 
propositions of Economics are on all fours with the propositions of all other 
sciences" (p. 104). But, surely, this conclusion also must strike many as a 
curious one, since Robbins's Essay is most well known for its conclusion that 
"Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship 
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses" (p. 16). How can 
a science of behavior in which individuals must make decisions over resource 
use be a natural science? The simple answer to this question is that it cannot. 
The more complicated answer is that while Robbins was correct to emphasize 
the choice as central to economics, he was mistaken in thinking that this did 
not require a conception of the methodology of economics distinct from the 
model offered by natural science. 
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SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PRACTICAL REASONING 
On the assumption that contemporary economics largely.follows Robbins in 
employing natural science methods of thinking and analysis, just how, then, 
is practical reasoning in economic life misrepresented? When we consider a 
demand relationship, the quantity demanded of a good is termed a dependent 
variable and the good's price is termed an independent variable. Economists 
sometimes hasten to add that this does not imply that price and quantity 
demanded are causally connected, with changes in the former necessitating 
changes in the latter. Yet this assertion, it seems, is at odds with the practice 
of attempting empirically to verify demand (and other) relationships in 
economics. Presumably the goal of empirical work is to show that there exist 
true relationships between whatever variables are the subject of investigation. 
But if such relationships truly obtain, then it follows that changes in 
independent variables are responsible for bringing about changes in depend-
ent variables, and this is the idea of causal connection.'True relationships, that 
is, are causal relationships, and thus the goal of empirical work in economics 
is to uncover causal laws governing economic phenomena, despite the fact 
that this implies that economic behavior is deterministic. 
Note that this conclusion is not undermined by saying that whatever 
demand behavior was in the past, it might be different in the future. If a 
demand relationship is said to have obtained in the past as a matter of fact, 
then it has already been asserted that price changes caused changes in quantity 
demanded. It is true that the world might well be different in the future, but ' 
if one later establishes a different set of empirically true relationships between 
variables, then one has only shown that different causal connections then 
obtained between those variables. Moreover, since we suppose that the laws 
of nature do not change, the establishment of a new causal relationship 
between variables seems to imply that the original specification of the model 
involved in the initial testing was somehow mistaken. Essentially, then, once 
one begins the project of finding true general relationships in economic 
behavior one commits oneself to the idea that causal relationships govern tha~ 
behavior. ~ 
Thus, although most economists believe that empirically established 
relationships in economics are meant to explain choice or decision behavior, 
the idea that these relationships display causal connections means that there 
is not only no need to refer to such behavior in the description of these 
relationships, but moreover to do so betrays a misunderstanding of the nature 
of choice behavior itself. A true empirical relationship between two variables 
implies that these variables will always be associated in a particular manner. 
But if they are to be invariably associated in some particular manner, then it 
cannot be the case that an agent has chosen to respond in the way this 
relationship requires, because choice presupposes the ability to act otherwise 
than one has. That is, that such a relationship obtains implies that agents must 
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always behave in accordance with it. At bottom, then, the idea of there being 
empirically established relationships in economics is incompatible with the 
idea of individuals exercising genuine choice or decision behavior in 
economic life, this despite the fact that economists generally believe 
themselves to be explaining choice behavior. 
Economists who accordingly model economic behavior functionally to 
permit empirical investigation must implicitly employ a theoretical under-
standing of behavior that precludes the exercise of agent choice.6 One way 
that this occurs is through a violation of the central assumption underlying 
practical reasoning as a distinct form of reasoning, namely, that the conclusion 
to a practical argument does not compel action or, as it was put above, that 
the demonstrated desirability of something does not entail its being desired by 
any given individual. From this perspective, economists wedded to the natural 
science model of explanation rule out choice behavior by effectively requiring 
that desirability does imply desire. That is, should some item be shown to be 
desirable for an individual, that individual must also desire that item, or else 
(as the theoretical syllogism has it) be charged with acting inconsistently. In 
economics, of course, failure to act as the model requires is termed irrational 
behavior, and only "acting" as one's preferences and opportunity sets dictate 
is regarded as rational. True, economists do not deny that individuals 
sometimes fail to act as their models require, but they do deny that there is 
a logic or form of reasoning that might render this behavior rational.? In this 
way they demonstrate their implicit commitment to a natural science 
interpretation of economic behavior. 
How, then, should economic behavior be described so as to be said 
purposive and intentional? The difficulty with the standard model is that the 
so-called goal or end, utility maximization, is not really a goal in the sense 
of being an end determined by the agent. Rather, the agent maximizes utility, 
because he or she possesses an unchosen preference structure that, upon being 
confronted with a set of stimuli designated as that agent's opportunity set 
(prices, income etc.) which defines the relevant setting and circumstances, 
dictates a rational "choice". A reasonable characterization of behavior that is 
purposive and intentional, however, would involve agent determination of 
goals, followed by subsequent action in accordance with those goals, 
followed by the evaluation of the appropriateness of the actions selected to the 
task of achieving the chosen goals, finally followed by reconsideration of 
goals that may be chosen in the future. In essence, purposive behavior 
involves an interaction between actions and goals that involves a process or 
series of steps in reasoning. The domain of practical reasoning, as investigated 
by philosophers (e.g. Anscombe 1957; Gautier 1963; Edgely 1969; Norman 
1971; Von Wright 1971; Komer 1974; Raz 1975, 1978), represents the field 
of logic that attempts to systematize the rules of inference involved in this 
form of reasoning. Without looking into this literature, it is possible to say 
briefly how the standard model of behavior used in economics circumvents 
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the sort of analysis that would be involved in an account of the interaction o( 
actions and goals. 
In the standard model of economic behavior, preferences are both complete 
and stable (Stigler and Becker 1977). Thus, if we examine behavior over a 
period of time, we can assume that action does not modify intention and that 
the goal of action, namely, to maximize utility, is constant. On this view, 
desirability dictates desire or preferences dictate action (given an opportunity 
set), essentially because the agent has a single, unchanging behavior function. 
In contrast, were agents to engage in goal-determining behavior on account 
(at least in part) of the actions they undertook, then the analysis of their 
behavior as agents would need to assume that their objectives at anyone point 
in time were incompletely determined, else they would be incapable of 
change. In effect, that our ends or goals may be reevaluated in light of actions 
performed tells us that our ends or goals at anyone point in time do not fully 
represent us. This incomplete determination is both incompatible with a 
functional analysis of behavior and also necessary to any theory of practical 
reasoning based on an interaction of actions and goals. The standard theory 
of economic behavior, then, achieves its results - and excludes a genuine 
theory of choice - by exhaustive definition of the agent's goals in a well-
defined objective function. Clearly, too, it is determinacy at this level which 
underlies the natural science approach in economics, since the project of 
discovering causal connections in any sphere depends upon treating beha-
vioral relationships in functional terms. 
A genuine choice theory of economic behavior, accordingly, needs to avoid 
functional analysis and preserve an element of indeterminacy in the goal-
setting behavior of the economic agent. Practical inference as a logic of ends-
means interaction, it might also thus be said, turns on recognizing an 
important asymmetry between the effects of ends on means (how our actions 
are informed by our intentions) and the effects of means on ends (how we 
revise our goals in light of the results of our actions). While how our means 
address our ends is usually a relatively straightforward, technical matter, how 
our ends are revised in light of the results of our actions is by comparison 
quite obscure, if only because of the difficulty in seeing clear patterns in our 
changing goals. The implication of this is that goals and ends possess an 
element of ambiguity that we may be mistakenly inclined to minimize to 
achieve more concrete results in social science. This was something that 
Robbins and the logical positivists seem to have concluded in judging ends 
as valuational (which is correct) and as such irrational (which is disputable).8 
There have been, it should be noted, many economists who have resisted 
this conception of the nature of economics, and some who have addressed the 
role Robbins's thinking has played in bringing it about. Among Austrian 
economists, Israel Kirzner (1960) has argued that Robbins's thinking about 
the nature of economics was particularly responsible for the confused view of 
economic decision-making held by so many contemporary economists. For 
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Kirzner, this approach led economists to over-appreciate static equilibrium 
methods and under-appreciate the active role of the entrepreneur in the 
economy. From the English Marshallian tradition, J. M. Keynes attacked 
Robbins ' s view of economics, precisely because he thought it led to a 
mistaken characterization of economics as a natural science. Adopting an 
older English political economy designation of social science as moral 
science, Keynes argued that the intentional nature of human behavior 
necessitated an altogether different methodology for economics. 
I also want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral 
science. I mentioned before that it deals with introspection and with values. 
I might have added that it deals with motives, expectations, psychological 
uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against treating the 
material as constant and homogeneous. 
(Keynes 1971-89: XIV, p. 300) 
However, neither Kirzner nor Keynes have had much influence on economic 
methodology, whatever their influence on economic theory itself. Indeed, the 
tremendous explosion of econometric techniques and methods that has 
occurred in recent decades dates from about the time of Keynes's criticisms 
of Robbins, when individuals such as Jan Tinbergen first began to apply 
mUltiple correlation techniques to macroeconomic data (1939).9 Perhaps in 
the case of Keynes, whose influence on economic theory has been consider-
able, it may have been that, though he distanced himself from traditional 
deductive logic in his own early work on probability theory (Keynes 1971-89: 
Vill), he never systematically went on to work out his thoughts about 
practical logic. Thus, though his emphasis on "motives, expectations, and 
psychological uncertainties" was entirely appropriate to an investigation of 
purposive behavior and intentional action, his failure to provide a clear 
rationale for this emphasis left his message muted. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL AND QUANTITATIVE WORK 
IN ECONOMICS 
What are the implications of the analysis above for empirical economic 
methodology and for the use of quantitative methods in economics? The 
argument here has been that the behavior of agents in economic life must be 
understood as exhibiting practical reasoning, and that economics needs to 
avoid representing agent behavior in natural science terms, that is, as a 
behavior explainable in terms of generalizable relationships that imply causal 
laws. This argument does not imply, it should be emphasized, that economics 
does not aim at producing true propositions about economic behavior. As a 
social science, of course, economics aims no less at producing truth than does 
natural science. Thus, while strict causal laws of the sort that are sought in 
natural science have no place in economics on the argument here, facts are 
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still very much an object of economic analysis. A classification of the kinds 
of factual propositions compatible with the assumption that individuals 
exercise practical reason in their economic behavior should accordingly 
provide guidelines for empirical economic research in economics. There seem 
to be two sorts of factual propositions in economics and social science. 
First, there are those general factual propositions that might be said to 
describe non-causal, "structural" relationships in the economy. Even though 
intentional, economic behavior in many contexts seems lethargic in the sense 
that slowly changing circumstances are often associated with little variation 
in individuals' ends and actions. Moreover, many economic categories and 
concepts involve a level of aggregation that typically obscures the intentional 
component in individual economic behavior. Thus, relationships that are 
"structural", in the sense that they largely omit reference to individual choice 
behavior and describe patterns of events that are simply highly confirmed 
rather than explainable as the products of agent choice behavior, are 
reasonably given mathematical and statistical treatment. Note that this has 
implications for our interpretation of the error term involved in probabilistic 
analysis. If we assume that behavioral equations tested possess at most an 
implicit reference to agents' intentional behavior, then the error term in such 
equations should no longer be said to reflect random elements in underlying 
agent behavior (since the idea of the true model being deterministic is 
contrary to our view of choice). Rather the error term should be thought to 
reflect the degree to which our "structural" equations fail to approximate 
agents' underlying intentional behavior. That is, the error term seems better 
understood as a measure of our failure to capture the essential variability of 
choice behavior in our effort to produce reasonably well confirmed but not 
exact characterizations of aggregate activity. 
Second, there are those particular factual propositions that aim only at 
explaining specific historical events. Since actions have causal impact, a large 
body of information may potentially be integrated and organized to produce 
a knowledge of past economic behavior and relationships. Economic history 
in this sense aims to explain unique historical occurrences as a result of the 
particular choices made by particular economic agents in particular circum-
stances. That is, economic history, by making the historical process its subject 
of investigation, focuses directly upon individuals' practical reasoning, or 
how intention informs action and is revised in light of its results. Put 
differently, this domain of economic investigation places its chief emphasis 
on documenting the development and change in agents ' motivations for 
action, and thus it is the traditional historian's methodologies rather than 
statistician's techniques that are what are required for this portion of empirical 
economics. 
These two kinds of factual propositions, however, appear to exhaust the 
allowable domain for empirical research in economics and social science. 
Only the former, however, allows for the use of contemporary quantitative 
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and statistical methods, and even in this connection considerable caution must 
be exercised in interpreting econometric results. It would thus be going too 
far to say that mathematical representation of economic relationships is an 
altogether misconceived enterprise. Rather the proper conclusion seems to be 
that mathematics is often misused in economics due to a failure to recognize 
the limitations placed on explanation in social science. Too much of 
contemporary economics can indeed be characterized as natural science 
masquerading as social science. What, then, it seems fair to recommend is that 
economists devote less effort to functional representation of economic 
behavior and more effort to investigating the dynamic and variable character 
of economic choice. This no doubt would diminish the value of much 
contemporary equilibrium analysis - a mainstay of modem economics. But it 
presumably would lead to better economic analysis and, perhaps, better 
explanation and prediction of economic events. 
NOTES 
Among contemporary economic theorists with this view are the Austrians, who 
treat economic decision-making as a process of creative discovery, and tradi-
tional institutionalist economists, who emphasize the complex role an economy's 
institutional fabric plays in influencing choice. 
2 Gordon' s (1992) monumental study of the history and philosophy of social 
science continually emphasizes this fundamental divide between natural and 
social science. 
3 See Gordon (1992: 590ff.) for an account of the rise and fall of logical 
positivism. 
4 Neither Robbins nor the logical positivists, it turned out, were really consistent 
on this last, central point. In particular, their methodological strictures themselves 
clearly lacked empirical foundations. 
5 To be sure, Robbins drew very much upon the Austrian school of economics for 
his principal inspiration, and this in important respects meant that his method-
ology was more apriorist than would have suited the logical positivists. The 
argument here concerns their common commitment to deductivist reasoning. 
6 A good example here is Elster (1989). Elster insists that the proper method for 
the social sciences is one that investigates causal mechanisms. When he comes 
to the analysis of choice and explanation of action his expedient is to speak of 
"two successive filtering operations" in our constraints and opportunities (p. 13). 
Nowhere in his discussion is he able to persuasively demonstrate that this 
analysis of behavior permits us to explain the real phenomena of choice 
behavior. 
7 Indeed, originally some of the most innovative work attempting to explain this 
apparently widespread "irrational" behavior as reasonable invoked the notion of 
a bounded or procedural rationality (Simon 1957). Such an analysis, however, 
still presupposes the natural science orientation in economics. 
8 Robbins is sometimes taken to have purged the remaining classical political 
economy elements from the neoclassical revolution in economic theory of the 
later nineteenth century, where the essence of that revolution was to make choice 
behavior central to economic analysis. On the interpretation here, that revolution 
was more responsible for making a deterministic functional analysis based on the 
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differential calculus the cornerstone of economics. Marshall's two blades of the 
supply-and-demand scissors, then, were the determinations of psychology and 
technology. 
9 Keynes also, it is worth noting, advanced one of the first major critiques of 
econometrics. 
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